This paper looks at targeting performance of the Indonesian health card programme that was implemented in August 1998 to protect access to health care for the poor during the Indonesian economic crisis. By February 1999, 22 million people had received a health card. The health card provided a user fee waiver for public health care. Targeting of the health card was pro-poor, but with considerable leakage to the non-poor. Utilisation of the health card for outpatient care was also pro-poor, but conditional on ownership, the middle quintiles were more likely to use the card.
Introduction
In an attempt to protect access to health care utilisation for the poor during the Indonesian economic crisis, a nationwide health programme was introduced in August 1998, as part of the larger Indonesian Social Safety Net -Jaring Pengaman Sosial (JPS). This health care programme included a targeted price subsidy that operated through the so called health card -Kartu Sehat. Households that were thought to be most vulnerable to economic shocks were allocated health cards, which entitled all household members to the price subsidy at public health care providers. The programme followed a partly decentralised targeting process, involving both geographic and community based individual targeting.
The success of such crisis interventions critically depends on the ability to identify and reach the poor, in particular those that are most vulnerable to the effects of a crisis. Successful targeting requires information on welfare and crisis impact for individual households. Typically, collecting such disaggregated information centrally is costly. The administrative capacity for providing welfare details for each household (for example, a centralised tax administration) is often not available in developing countries like Indonesia. Moreover, short term information regarding the crisis effects for individual households would be hard to retrieve even under a highly developed administrative system. For example, in case of the Indonesian crisis, Skoufias et al. (2000) find evidence of considerable movement in and out of poverty from 1997 to 1998, hindering accurate targeting of the poor.
The decentralised design of the JPS programmes is meant to deal with this targeting problem. The combination of multi-level geographic and community based targeting provides an alternative infrastructure for gathering and processing information locally, and disseminating this to higher administrative levels. Several authors have argued that a decentralised design can benefit from local knowledge and community participation, on the premise that local communities are more capable of identifying the poor.
1 Not only do local communities have better access to information on targeting criteria, they are also more able to prioritise amongst the set criteria or even formulate new local criteria that better reflect the need for assistance.
However, decentralisation has its weaknesses. Recently, a number of theoretical and empirical studies have investigated the implications and pitfalls of different aspects of decentralisation (e.g. regional political or fiscal autonomy). A main concern is that the benefits of using local knowledge are offset against the loss of control over the allocation process. Decentralised programmes are prone to local elite capture and suffer from classic principal-agent dilemmas (e.g. Bardhan and Mookherjee 2000 and 2005 , Galasso and Ravallion 2005 . In a comprehensive review of the empirical literature on targeting Coady et al. (2004) find that geographic and community based targeting perform above average, but with a large variation between the individual projects.
This paper deals with the targeting of the JPS health programme, in light of the decentralised design. The objective is to investigate how the programme has been implemented and who were the beneficiaries of the health cards. Has health card allocation been pro-poor and is there evidence of leakage or local capture of benefits by the non-poor? Particular focus will be on the effectiveness of regional targeting policy in contrast to local (within-district) targeting by the allocation committees. What factors underlie the observed patterns of benefit incidence? Has the centre been able to identify the regions hit hardest by the crisis? What determines targeting at local level? Are there barriers unabridged by the health card? Finally, a micro-simulation exercise will decompose overall benefit incidence into geographic and local targeting performance.
The next section sets the context of the programme and contains a detailed description of the programme design. Section 3 proposes the methodology and describes the data. The results are presented and discussed in section 4, while section 5 concludes.
Background
The Indonesian economic crisis
The Indonesian economic crisis was triggered by a financial crisis that hit Southeast Asia mid 1997. In addition, eastern Indonesia, Java and Sumatra were struck by El Niño showed slight signs of recovery, which was partly attributed to the health card programme (Pradhan et al. forthcoming) .
The JPS health card programme
At the onset of the Indonesian financial crisis an important concern was whether the achievements made in the social sectors over the past decades could be sustained. The
Indonesian government, with help of donors, reacted swiftly by introducing a social safety net intervention aimed at safeguarding real incomes and access to social services for the poor.
A main component of the social safety net was the revitalisation of the health card programme, which started in the fall of 1998. 5 This card existed before the onset of the crisis, but its use had been negligible. A health card entitled a household to free services at public health care providers consisting of (1) outpatient and inpatient care, (2) contraceptives for women of child bearing age, (3) pre-natal care and (4) assistance at birth. This study is limited to outpatient health care utilisation. The public health care providers where the health cards could be used received budgetary support. These grants were meant to compensate for the expected demand due to the health card and maintain quality of health care. However, there was a loose relationship between the utilisation of the health card and the compensation that the health care providers received in return.
Compensation was allocated based on the estimated number of households eligible for the health card programme rather than actual utilisation of the health cards. The 1998/1999 budget for JPS health grants to primary health centres (Puskesmas) and village midwives (Bidan di desa) amounted to US $ 29 million, financed by the Government of Indonesia and the Asian Development Bank.
The JPS health programme followed a decentralised design, with part of the targeting and allocation process delegated to district administrations, villages officials and public health care providers. The number of health cards and the amount of compensation to health care providers was determined by a prosperity measure for 307 district (urban kota and rural kabupaten), which was provided by the National Family
Planning Coordinating Agency -Badan Koordinasi Keluarga Berencana Nasional (BKKBN). This prosperity measure is a poverty headcount ratio, defining a household as poor if it fails one or more of the following 5 basic needs criteria: (i) households can worship according to faith, (ii) eat basic food twice a day, (iii) have different clothing for school/work and home/leisure activities, (iv) have a floor that is made out of something other than earth, and (v) have access to modern medical care for children or access to modern contraceptive methods. The BKKBN collects this information nationwide on a census basis. The BKKBN prosperity measure has been criticised to be an unsuitable allocation criterion for the JPS, since its components are fairly inflexible and inappropriate for measuring economic shocks or the impact of a crisis. However, at the time of implementation it was the only up to date welfare measure at hand. The BKKBN prosperity measure was also used as allocation rule for both the budgetary support to facilities and health cards to households.
Targeting within districts followed a two stage process. Special district committees allocated compensation funds to public health care providers according to the estimated number of health card eligible households living in the area served by the provider. The transfer size was not influenced by the actual services provided to health card owners, but based on BKKBN headcounts in the village or sub-district. Health cards were allocated to villages, again based on the BKKBN measure, and subsequently distributed to eligible households through local health centres and village midwives.
Eligible households were those that were considered poor following the BKKBN classification. In addition, targeting of households relied heavily on local knowledge by granting local leaders to define additional criteria according to their own insights regarding the effects of the crisis.
Methodology and data

Benefit incidence analysis and targeting performance
The analysis starts with a benefit incidence analysis of health card allocation and utilisation, and then investigates the factors driving observed benefit incidence patterns by focusing on the targeting instruments and barriers at three layers of the targeting process: the geographic unit (inter-district targeting), the community (intra-district targeting) and the household (utilisation). Finally, geographic targeting performance is linked to individual heath card allocation and utilisation by simulating targeting regimes.
The benefit incidence analysis describes the coverage and concentration of receipt 
where X jk reflects the characteristics and village conditions for a household j (in district k) that may be considered as local targeting criteria. BKKBN k contains targeting criteria for sub-districts and districts. Although it was no an official targeting criterion, the model also control for the BPS district poverty headcount, as irregularities in allocation were correlated with the average level of poverty. The error term ε jk reflects unobserved factors affecting targeting. The marginal effects can be interpreted as reflecting intra-district targeting since the district targeting rules have been controlled for. 6 Even if households receive a health card, there may still be barriers to using it, such as lack of information, regional shortage of providers, or opportunity costs unabridged by the health card. Such barriers are likely to vary by households and are likely to be higher for the poor. To this end, the third stage of the targeting process is considered through probit analysis of the determinants of health card utilisation (hcu ijk ) conditional on health card ownership
The unit of analysis is the individual. X ijk contains the same variables as in equation (1), in addition to gender and age of individual i. Since the model is estimated for health card recipients, and health card allocation was not random, consistency of the β estimates is typically compromised by selection effects. Sample selection is controlled for by the selection term λ = E(ε | hc = 1). Under the normality assumptions of a probit analysis, λ is the inverse Mills ratio computed from the health card allocation probit estimates. 7 To facilitate identification, the BKKBN district and sub-district targeting variables are excluded in equation (2). These regional BKKBN indicators were used for geographic targeting but should not play a role in the individuals' decision to use the health card. The simulation exercise comes down to using the probit estimates for ranking households within districts in terms of eligibility. Households are selected into the programme according to their eligibility rank until the district quota is reached.
Geographic targeting regimes are then imposed by changing the number of households selected for the programme in each district, keeping the overall size of the programme constant. That is, the districts' share in the programme is altered, not the total amount of health cards.
In order to rank households within districts, the probit estimates are not sufficient; the unobserved errors are also needed. To see this, consider equation (1): hc * can be interpreted as latent programme eligibility, where the eligibility threshold of selection is normalised to zero. This latent eligibility can be constructed from the probit's linear prediction and the unobserved error term. Therefore the errors are drawn from a truncated standard normal distribution, such that 0
household j received a health card, and the opposite if otherwise.
9 A similar approach is taken for utilisation: conditional on health card allocation to households under a specific geographic targeting regime, an individual's utilisation behaviour is evaluated according to the linear prediction of the utilisation probit (2) and error ijk ṽ . In this way it is possible to track the effects of regional redistribution of health cards to household level allocation of health cards, and then to individual utilisation of the health card for outpatient care.
Data sources
The key source of data is Indonesia's main socioeconomic survey (Susenas). The Susenas is conducted annually on a national scale, collecting information on health care utilisation, 
Results and Discussion
Benefit incidence
The health card programme was already of a substantial magnitude in February 1999 with 10.6 percent of Indonesians living in a household with a health card. Health card recipients show a higher utilisation of outpatient care than non-recipients. The difference is largest with utilisation of public care. Amongst health card recipients, 15.1 percent visited an outpatient provider during the 3 months prior to the survey. For non-health card recipients this is lower, at 12.9 percent. Although health card owners tend to choose public providers more often, they do not always use their health card. 3.7 out of 10.4 percent of the health card owners report not to use the health card when seeking care at a public provides.
What could explain the weak link between ownership and utilisation? Providers were not reimbursed based on actual services provided, but on the predicted demand.
Possibly, the providers themselves selected who they deemed in need for subsidised services and did not always honour the rule that those who could present a health card should be provided free services. Alternatively, rich household may decide to forgo the option of free health care, preferring the higher quality private facilities instead of the public health care centre. Strauss et al. (2004) show that at some public health clinics not all services were covered by the health card, but that this can not fully explain the under-usage of health cards. Qualitative research by Soelaksono et al. (1999) find that at some public facilities, the time allocated to patients with a health card was limited, and that in remote areas the lack of access to the nearest public facility was a possible deterrent to use the health card.
They also found indications that patients perceived the care received using a health card to be of lower quality than services and medicines obtained when not using the health card. In addition, the public perception was that treatment at the public clinic was less effective than at private sector.
Health cards are distributed pro-poor, as shown in Table 2 . Amongst the poorest 20 percent of the population 18.5 percent had a health card. Incidence of health card receipt drop as per capita expenditure increases, from 13.7 percent in the second quintile to 3.7 in the richest quintile. The allocation shares for ownership and utilisation are presented in columns 3 and 5 of Utilisation of health cards for outpatient care shows a less pro-poor distribution than allocation. Conditional on having a health card, the middle quintiles are more likely to use it. That means that those who received benefits were on average wealthier than those who received the card. Barriers of access to health care seem higher for the poor.
Even though the non-poor are more likely to use their health card when they have one, most of the benefits still accrue to the poor. This is because the initial distribution of the health card is distributed pro-poor. Almost three quarters of the health cards is distributed in rural areas. But relative to this distribution, the use of the cards is similar between rural and urban areas.
Geographical targeting and crisis impact
How well did the district targeting criteria reflect regional differences in poverty and impact of the crisis? Several studies have raised concern about the lack of reliable data available for geographic targeting (e.g. Ananta and Siregar 1999 , Daly and Fane 2002 , Dhanani and Islam 2002 , Pritchett et al. 2002 . Given the heterogeneous nature of the crisis, it is likely that criteria for regional targeting misjudged the degree of poverty in the districts, since only pre-crisis information on regional poverty was available. There are two reasons for this. First, the crisis has given rise to large relative price changes, between products (especially food) and across regions (Cameron 1999 , Frankenberg et al. 2003 , Friedman and Levinsohn 2002 . This variation is completely ignored in the targeting process when pre-crisis poverty estimates are applied as allocation rule in 1999.
Second, the effects of the crisis varied strongly between regions and were only weakly correlated with the initial level of poverty (Sumarto et al. 1998) . This heterogeneity of the crisis impact is shown in Figure 1 , which plots 1996 consumption based poverty against the change from 1996 to 1999. The difference between 1996 and 1999 estimates reflects the impact of the crisis. It indicates the absolute change in the fraction of people that moved into or out of poverty during the crisis. In line with Sumarto et al. (1998) , there appears to be no correlation between the initial level of poverty and the impact of the crisis.
The BKKBN data are collected at more frequent intervals than the consumption surveys. They can provide fairly up to date information, as far down as the household level. The problem, however, is that the components of the BKKBN classification are inflexible measures and inappropriate for capturing the degree of poverty when faced with severe economic shocks of a crisis.
13 Table 3 is illustrative for the difficulty of capturing the effect of the crisis using pre-crisis data. The table shows the ranking of provinces (from low to high) according to the 1999 (BPS99) and 1996 (BPS96) poverty headcount of BPS, the BKKBN measure.
The different welfare measures show different levels of poverty. As expected, the consumption based poverty headcount estimates for 1996 are lower than for 1999.
Evaluating welfare by the basic needs criteria of the BKKBN yields a higher count of deprived households. In itself this is not surprising. What is important is that the ranking is different. The ranking following the BKKBN measure differs from both the levels and changes of poverty, as measured by BPS.
The differences between the welfare measures are further illustrated by a graphical exposition. Figure 2 and Figure 3 plot the BKKBN targeting rule against the poverty BPS estimates. The BKKBN prosperity score is strongly positively correlated with the 1999 poverty headcount, but with a lot of variation around the trend. This is expected since the BKKBN criteria are not solely based on household consumption.
There is a weakly positive correlation between the change in poverty and the BKKBN measure for the main body of districts and a greater variation amount the mean. The trend line is pulled up by a small number of districts that experienced a large increase in poverty.
Actual allocation of health cards is less correlated with expenditure based poverty than the BKKBN criteria are. There seems to be little correlation between BPS poverty and the allocation of health cards reported in the Susenas data (Figure 4 ). This indicates a fuzzy relationship between the BKKBN targeting criteria and actual allocation. This could be due to delays in the implementation or regional difference in efficiency of the programme. But if it is, then these irregularities are greater in relatively poor districts.
Community based targeting and health card utilisation
What are the key factors that determine targeting at the community level? There are significant negative effects of per capita consumption on the probability of receiving a health card, confirming the pro-poor targeting found in the benefit incidence analysis. For the use of the health card conditional upon owning one, the results do not reflect the slightly non-poor pattern found in the benefit incidence. It could be that observed utilisation differences between quintiles are too small to yield statistically significant marginal effects in the multivariate analysis. Alternatively, it could be that the non-poor bias in utilisation is not a direct wealth effect but follows from other background characteristics, which are correlated with wealth.
Sector of employment affects both allocation and utilisation. The probability of receiving a health card is lower for households for whom agriculture is the main source of income, while they are also less likely to use it for outpatient care. This may indicate that the opportunity costs of time spent at the health clinic or travelling are relatively higher for farm households.
Supply and access of health care at village level plays an important role in the targeting process. The number of auxiliary public clinics negatively affects the probability of receiving a health card. But conditional on ownership the presence of primary and auxiliary public clinics in the village strongly increases the use of health cards for outpatient care. Further, utilisation of health cards is higher in villages where the village leader views health care facilities to be easy or very easy to reach. Overall, the results suggest that, while remote and less wealthy areas with little access to health care receive priority in the targeting process, the direct and indirect costs of using the cards are relatively high. On the other hand, the probability of selection increases as the number of midwives living in the village increases. In addition, there is also a positive correlation with utilisation. Since it is the medical staff of local clinics that actually distribute the health cards to households, this might reflect the importance of informal contacts within the village for awareness of, and participation in, social programmes.
The probit results confirm that health cards have been awarded to households based on health status. The official allocation rules require health cards to be distributed to the poor, irrespective of their health status. But the clearly positive effect on the variable measuring whether any household member has its daily activities disrupted through illness indicates that often health cards were given based on acute need. For those who fall ill and do not own a health card, it is still possible to get a health card after seeking medical care (Soelaksono et al. 1999 ).
Turning to household composition, the results show that (conditional on per capita consumption) households with a relatively large share of children and elderly have a higher probability of receiving and using a health card. Conditional on household composition, larger households are less likely of receiving and using a health card.
Household headed by females have a significantly higher chance of receiving a health card. There is a negative correlation between the education of the head of household and the probability of receiving a health card. But controlling for other household variables, the characteristics of the head of household seem less important for utilisation.
Women tend to use the cards more for outpatient care than men do. The outpatient utilisation variable does not reflect the use of health cards for contraception and family planning services. Nevertheless, it could be that the availability of these services under the health card has raised awareness of its usefulness amongst women. Utilisation shows a U-shaped age pattern as the young and the old use the card relatively more.
The results confirm that the BKKBN prosperity status variables have influenced health card allocation. An increase in the district and sub-district BKKBN basic needs measure increases the probability of receiving a health card. Amongst the individual BKKBN criteria floor material is a strong predictor for health card ownership. Those with an earth floor have a higher chance of receiving a health card, but a lower probability of actually using it for outpatient care. Being able to worship according to faith decreases the probability of receiving a health card. Interestingly, the individual's perception of freedom in practicing personal faith is positively correlation with utilisation of the health card. Owning different sets of clothing for work and leisure decreases the probability of using a health card. In contrast to the other BKKBN indicators, having access to modern care does not yield the expected effect, as it increases both the chance of receiving a health card and, conditional on ownership, the probability of using it. This suggests the presence of two countervailing effects: accessibility to public providers increases exposure to the programme, which outweighs the official targeting criterion.
Simulation results
The simulations are presented in 
Conclusion
There is clear evidence that the JPS health card programme was pro-poor in the sense that the poor had a higher probability of receiving a health card and using it to obtain free health services. However, despite pro-poor targeting, a considerable number of health cards went to households in the richer quintiles.
The programme was implemented at the remarkable speed: by February 1999 approximately 22 million people (about 11 percent of Indonesians) lived in households that received a health card. The decentralised programme design may well have facilitated this swift reaction, by relying on existing administrative and operational infrastructure within the districts. However, at such short notice there was no reliable data on the impact of the crisis across districts. Geographic targeting criteria were therefore based poverty estimates that reflect the actual level of poverty to some extent but do not capture the impact of the crisis. There appears to be no correlation between the initial level of poverty and the impact of the crisis.
A notable finding is that some health card owners did not use their health card when obtaining care from public service providers. The particular design resulted in a discrepancy between health card ownership and utilisation. Moreover, utilisation of subsidised services is less pro-poor than ownership. Conditional on ownership, the middle quintiles have a higher propensity to use their health card, suggesting that access barriers to health care are not fully overcome by a user fee waiver. The main deterrent seems to be the opportunity costs of seeking health care. The direct and indirect costs of using the health card are relatively higher in the more remote, and rural villages with little access to public health care providers. While the more remote areas were targeted because of the lack of access to health care facilities, it is for the same reason that usage rates are low.
Micro-simulations show that geographic targeting can contribute considerably to improving targeting performance. Nevertheless, most of the targeting gains are to be made at the community level.
In terms of policy implications for future safety nets and crisis responses, the need for adequate information systems is apparent from this study. While the decentralised design of the programme seems flexible in a crisis situation, up to date information and early signalling of crisis effects are crucial. In addition, further research would need to investigate how local information can best be exploited under decentralised and community based targeting in signalling crisis related poverty dynamics and local barriers to access. Traditional health care is not included. 5 The JPS further included an education, food security, labour creation and micro credit programmes. Ananta and Siregar (1999) and Daly and Fane (2002) provide a good overview of all the JPS programmes. 6 An alternative specification would be to include the observed health card coverage in districts. However, this variable would be endogenous to the outcome variable.
7 Since the utilisation probit (2) is estimated for individuals, so is the first stage allocation probit that is used for computing the selection term. The variables are the same as those included in the household level analysis in (1) and the estimation results are very similar. The results are available upon request.
8 Nevertheless, there may be reasons why the BKKBN indicators could still be correlated with utilisation. The BKKBN indicators determined the amount of JPS financial compensation to health facilities, and thus health care quality and supply.
Moreover, they might be correlated with local level of welfare (or deprivation), and thus with health care demand. I therefore estimated equation (2) with the BKKBN variables (without λ). Their marginal effects were small and statistically non significant. Although this does not constitute a formal test, it is a strong indication that the exclusion restriction is justified. The results are available upon request.
9 The errors are computed as
where H and L are the upper and lower truncation points, respectively. Ф reflects the standard normal cdf and u is a drawn from a uniform distribution with a value between 0 and 1. 12 See BPS (2000) for details. 13 The main criticism in this respect is that the BKKBN measure is based on fixed assets (type of floor and owning clothes) and non-economic questions regarding religious practices. Sumarto et al. (2003) place further questions with interregional consistency of the BKKBN measure as the village staff who collect the BKKBN data receive relatively little training, and the figures are vulnerable to manipulation by local government officials. Using data from a longitudinal survey in 100 villages, Suryahadi et al. (1999) show that there is a high degree of mismatch between the BKKBN classification and expenditure based poverty measures. For example, the BKKBN data classify 49 percent of the households in the sample as poor. But according to per capita consumption, only 57 percent of these households rank with the poorest 49 percent of the population.
14 Some observations were lost due to a few missing values in the covariates, and merging the Susenas and Podes data. The simulated programme sizes therefore differ slightly from the actual observed size. Overall incidence varies between 10.7 and 10.9 percent, slightly above the observed 10.6 percent reported in Table 2 Tables  Table 1 Targeting Pseudo R-squared 0.10 0.09
Robust standard errors in brackets + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
